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Abstract: State and multinational efforts aimed at containing jihadist terrorism
in northern Nigeria have only yielded modest results despite the repressive
nature of these efforts. The ranks of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram and Ansaru
fundamentalist Islamic sects continue to swell even in the face of the ferocious
onslaught on their membership by state troops. In contrast to mainstream analyses
that highlight the salience of radical Islamism in coming to terms with insurgent
proliferation, this article demonstrates that jihadist insurgency in northern Nigeria
is better understood as a consequence of youth bulge syndrome, particularly the
low-cost availability of foot soldiers from the almajiri demographic cohort.
Abandoned by parents and the state, the itinerant Quranic pupils resort to street,
begging for alms and survival. And “street life” exposes the urchins to abuse,
criminalization and subsequent mobilization for violent causes including terrorism.
It is argued that until the practices of rampant child abuse and state neglect of the
almajirai and other vulnerable groups are addressed through better education,
employment opportunities and poverty reduction, northern Nigeria is likely to
remain a breeding ground of violent conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurgent activities have surged across Nigeria since the country returned to civilian
rule in 1999 after over 16 years of continuous military dictatorship. From the Niger
Delta in the South through the North-central region to the hardcore North, violent 
conflicts have been a hallmark of social life in Africa’s most populous and largest oil-
producing nation. The Boko Haram (BH) uprising is the deadliest conflict yet since
the 1967-1970 Nigerian Civil War that claimed over a million lives. The BH, which
formed in 2009 in northern Nigeria, was rated in 2012 as the second deadliest terror
group in the world, having killed a total of 1,132 persons in 364 attacks, only surpassed
by Afghanistan’s Taliban, which killed 1,842 persons in 525 attacks (Guardian,
2013a; Egharevba & Aghedo, 2013). According to a recent study conducted for the
American government by the University of Maryland on global terrorism, such BH-
related deaths exceeded those inflicted by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Maoists in India, and
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Employing strategies such as
assassination, arson, jail breaks, terrorist kidnapping, and suicide bombing among 
others, the Islamic fundamentalist group targets security formations, government 
institutions, authority figures, churches, schools, media and Western interests with the
ultimate motive of establishing an Islamic republic to replace the secular state in Nigeria
(Osumah, 2013; LeVan, 2013).
The Nigerian state has relied heavily on repressive instrumentalities in managing
BH violence (including arrest, detention, proscription of the group, declaration of
emergency rule in parts of the North, and killing of the sect’s members) despite the
fact that some perceptive observers and analysts of the region argue for conciliatory
measures, including poverty alleviation, mass literacy promotion, dialogue, and
amnesty with pay (this last being the approach the government adopted in the case of the
oil-producing Niger Delta region of the country; see Aghedo, 2013). Even though the
state has mooted the idea of a possible dialogue and amnesty, its security management
strategy has been ostensibly brutal, perhaps in line with the “war on terror” doctrine that
the United States and its allies have articulated in response to transnational terrorism.
Indeed, on November 13, 2013, the United States formally designated BH and Ansaru
as foreign terrorist organizations and as specially designated global terrorists after 
initially offering a $7 million reward for information leading to the capture of BH
leader, Abubakar Shekau (Campbell, 2013).
Despite repressive counterterrorist tactics, the BH membership has become more
radicalized and continues to swell, much to the consternation of the Nigerian state and
its foreign sympathizers. Most analysts blame terrorism escalation on militant Salafism
(Agbiboa, 2013; Alao, 2013; Winters, 1987). In contrast, we contend in this article that
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BH proliferation and escalation are better understood as a consequence of a “youth
bulge” syndrome, especially the availability of “cheap” foot soldiers from among the
almajirai (singular almajiri). These itinerant Quranic pupils, we argue, do not only
constitute the largest number of out-of-school children in the country and a tremedous
challenge to the realization of both national and international conventions and protocols
related to children, including education for all objectives and the millennium develop-
ment goals, but also pose a direct threat to national security. Yet security scholars and
analysts have not significantly explored the almajiri phenomenon. We attempt to fill this
research fissure by revealing how parental child abuse and state neglect fuel insecurity in
northern Nigeria with the consequence that many almajirai have foregone begging for
alms and taken up arms instead.
The menace of street children, it must be noted, is not peculiar to northern Nigeria,
as evidenced by the hooliganism of “area boys” (a generic term for mostly male delin-
quent youths) in many southwestern cities of Nigeria, especially Lagos (Olley, 2006;
Momoh, 2000). And there are a few almajirai in other West African states with sizable
Muslim populations, such as Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Moreover, the
youth crisis in other parts of Africa, especially the predicament and dangers of street
urchins in such countries as Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Africa (Kaplan, 2006;
Vigh, 2006; Abdullah, 1997), has been critically interrogated. For example, O’Brien
(1996) locates the root cause of youth crisis in poor governance and obnoxious 
economic policies such as the structural adjustment program of the mid-1980s, which
have made the hope of the youth unrealizable. Similarly, Gore and Pratten (2003) and
Diouf (2003) argue that because many hopeless young Africans now operate from a
marginal geography and culture that is largely oppositional and antagonistic to the
dominant culture, their engagement with the state has become ambivalent, characterized
by complicity, insurgency, and disengagement. This alienation in turn pushes the
youth resorting to embrace alternative survival strategies outside mainstream and
socially approved means of livelihood, which exposes the entire society to instability.
Other scholars blame the crisis on the ambivalent character of African elites, who
often violently mobilize vulnerable youth in their overweaning struggle for power and
resources. Many young people are now seen as an “expendable category” and a “war
machine” in much of Africa today (Maclay & Ozerdem, 2010; Chabal, 2005; Lewis,
2004; Ukiwo, 2002).
A number of scholars locate the rootedness of youth crisis in the African colonial
situation, although they agree that postcolonial misgovernance has compounded 
the problem. In colonial Africa, as Richard remarks, “the disruptive and unequal
opportunities of social and economic change and the realities of racial domination
were apparently creating juvenile delinquents, not junior citizens, and encouraging
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new forms of unruliness and defiance” (2006, p. 79). Similarly, obnoxious colonial
policies had led to the emergence of “Jaguda Boys” in Nigeria for whom petty crime
was a matter of survival, and in certain situations violence might be functional for the
young. Today, the growing incapacity of many states to ensure good governance and
human security has exacerbated the crisis of African youth, who have become, as
Osaghae rightly notes, “a social category in crisis, being excluded, marginalised,
threatened, victimised, abused, and consequently angry, bitter, frustrated, desperate
and violent” (2007, p 7). But crucially, even advanced societies such as the United
States and United Kingdom are also not immune from youth crisis, as exemplified by
sporadic shooting sprees at cinemas, on campuses and in the streets by gun-trotting
young men (Foley, 2009). However, the African youth experience is dire, which is even
more disheartening given that at independence in the 1960s, the youth were conceived
as the hope of the continent. The almajiri phenomenon in northern Nigeria clearly
showcases the descent and overwhelmimg crisis of the African youth.
To set the tone for the discourse, the following questions suffice: What is the rela-
tionship between BH and the almajirai? And how can we make sense of almajiri-related
insecurity? In proferring answers to these questions, we argue that the BH Islamic 
fundamentalist sect draws a substantial number of its foot soldiers from the almajiri
demographic cohort. Thus, addressing the driver of BH terrorism requires an approach
that tackles the root causes of the almajiri problem; and an understanding of the causes
may contribute to finding a way to deny BH easy access to its “war machine.” This
interrogation of terrorist recruitment strategy is therefore novel and provides some
insights into how best to respond and mitigate the scourge of terrorism in Nigeria. The
article is structured into six parts. Following this introduction is the second segment
which examines the analytical utility of the concept of “youth bulge.” The third slice
examines the origin and dynamics of the almajiri phenomenon. The fourth part 
considers the security implications of the almajirai. The fifth portion addresses the 
drivers of the almajiri syndrome. The sixth and final section offers a number of policy
prescriptions.
THEORIZING YOUTH BULGE
We situate the almajiri phenomenon and its attendant insecurity within the context
of “youth bulge.” There is no universally agreed-on definition of the term “youth”.
However, the concept is often used to describe the age bracket between 15 and 24,
though the upper age range could be as high as 35 in many African countries and the
lower range as low as 12 in others, such as Jordan (Hilker & Fraster, 2009). Also,
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there can be a high degree of overlap between the definitions of “youth” and “children.”
For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines “child” as anyone
under the age of 18 years. In essence, youth “is better understood as a transitional
stage in life between childhood and adulthood rather than as a rigid construct based on
age” (Hilker & Traser, 2009, p. 9).
The term “youth bulge” was coined by German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn
and popularized in the 1990s by American political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack
Goldstone (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012; LaGraffe, 2012). Proponents of the theory argue
that “societies characterized by a youth bulge (a burgeoning youth population) while
simultaneously facing limited resources and, in particular, a lack of prestigious posi-
tions for ‘surplus’ youngsters—i.e. the third, fourth, fifth etc. born children—are much
more prone to social unrest and acting belligerent towards their neighbours than 
those societies without these demographic stressors” (Schomaker, 2013, p. 117). The
theoretical foundation of the youth bulge is based on the premise that countries with
weak political institutions that are undergoing demographic transitions are vulnerable
to social unrest, rebellion, and violent conflicts because of the likelihood that the
unemployed male youth will seek socioeconomic advancement through extralegal
means. Societies that fit the youth bulge profile are mostly prevalent in sub-Saharan
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands and usually have a large youth
cohort (over 30 percent) relative to the adult populations (Schomaker, 2013; Hart,
Atkins, Markey, & Youniss, 2004).
Though the youth bulge theory gained much prominence in social science circles
only in the 1990s, the historical data suggests that youth cohorts have longed played a
critical role in conflicts. For example, a youth-bulge syndrome was evident in Russia
between 1897 and just before the young Bolsheviks staged the 1917 Revolution. 
Similarly, historical studies have implicated youth bulges in revolutions in 17th-century
England, 18th-century France, and 20th- century Indonesia, France, and Iran (Goldstone,
2002; Moller, 1968). More recent researches have linked youth bulges to political
activism, warfare, and terrorist uprisings, especially in the Arab world (Hoffman
&Jamal, 2012; Huntington, 1996). The Arab Spring and the Islamic revivalism that
swept across countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and others are further
manifestations of the growing link between demography and security. The theory has
been influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy; indeed, some of the advocates of youth
bulge such as Fuller and Goldstone have been appointed as advisors in key U.S. 
government agencies, including the CIA (Schomaker, 2013).
However, the intersection between youth bulge and violence is not automatic.
There are a number of variables that intervene between demography and security. Some
of the conditions that exacerbate the youth bulge phenomenon include unemployment,
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relative poverty, and urbanization. Members of the youth demographic cohort find it
difficult to translate their education into sustainable jobs in fragile states, leading 
them into poverty. As noted by LaGraffe (2012, p. 67), demography acts as a “force
multiplier,” aggravating these preexisting conditions. The alienation, frustration, and
growing discontent arising from lack of sustainable livelihoods, along with other 
stressors, make the youth easily susceptible to mobilization for violence. The volatility
of a ballooning youth population, especially of youths between ages 15-24, is further
propelled by the lack of developmental maturity on the part of the so-called “surplus
sons”. Added to these intervening variables is being unmarried, which means the
young men tend to have time for risky engagements, including participation in rebellion
that are known to have a low opportunity costs. Thus, angry male youths are allegedly
“driven to violence by their very biology” (Corner House, 2004, p.10).
The theory of youth bulge is particularly suitable in relation to Africa because of
the unemployment and poverty profile of the continent and the fact that the youth 
constitute more than 35 percent of the population. The population of people under 14
years is even over 44 percent in such countries as Sierra Leone (Bricker & Foley,
2013; Mkandawire, 2002; Kaplan, 1994). The lack of “access to power, position and
other resources by the youth greatly reduces their space of possibilities,” which is
often interpreted as “social death” (Vigh 2006, p. 37). A burgeoning African youth
population coexists with “soaring unemployment, endemic poverty, and failing
schools” (Potts & Campbell, 2009, quoted in Kegley & Blanton, 2011, p.490). Indeed,
Kaplan (2006) paints a tapestry of horror of African youth and the volatile environ-
ment they inhabit because of their constricted options. The crisis of the African state
compounds the phenomenon of youth bulge, driving young Africans to seek escape
from “confining structures and navigate economic, social and political turmoil”
(Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh, 2006, p. 9). This disenchantment has been further
accentuated by a pervasive negative culture which Abdullah (1997) called “lumpen
youth.” This street-based culture positions the youth against mainstream culture with
attendant negative consequences.
Despite its popularity, youth bulge theory has been criticized for being a tool for
the promotion of American interests. It has been alleged that the “demographic time
bomb associated with a youth bulge is a myth used by the US to justify its military
intervention and population control efforts in the South” (Corner House, 2004, p. 2).
The criticism has been further buttressed by the fact that youth bulge theory was origi-
nally aimed at providing US intelligence with a tool by which to uncover national
security threats, coupled with the fact that a large youth population could be a blessing
rather than a curse, as exemplified by the Asian Tigers (Corner House, 2004).
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the theory makes intuitive sense. A surge in youth
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population means an increase in the demand for jobs and other sociopolitical goods. 
In weak societies that are characterized by corruption, poor governance, ineffective
public institutions, and an attendant high rate of unemployment and poverty, the youth
often use their energy and vigor for antisocial and violent purposes.
THE ALMAJIRI PHENOMENON: ORIGIN, AIMS AND DYNAMICS
The almajiri practice is an old tradition that remains attractive to certain segments
of the population. The word “almajiri” is an adulterated spelling of the Arabic word
“almuhajir,” which refers to a person who migrates for the purpose of learning or for
the sake of propagating Islamic knowledge. Every year, usually after harvest, people
inhabiting a particular neighborhood would gather their children, mostly school-age
males (from age six upward), and hand them to an Islamic scholar (mallam). The 
mallam’s purpose was to teach the children the basics of Islam and how to write and
recite the Arabic alphabet (Oladosu, 2012). In order to escape the distractions of life,
the mallam would take the almajirai out of the city to a camp where they were taught
self-reliance as well as discipline. Sometimes, when there was shortage of food, the
Quranic teacher would send the pupils out to solicit for food from residents around
and the food would be brought back to the camp for all to eat. This practice of soliciting
for food by the almajirai became known as “almajiranchi”—a practice meant to make
them strong and to prepare them for life’s struggle.
In fact, the almajiri system produced eminent jurists, Islamic scholars and religious
reformers in the past, when their numbers remained within manageable limits. Since
the 11th century, Quranic teaching has been a medium of Islamic education in the
country. The population of Nigeria is about 50.4 percent Muslim, 48.2 percent Christian,
and 1.3 percent adherents of other faiths (Kew and Lewis, 2013). Currently, Nigeria
has a 9-3-4 system of formal education: compulsory basic schooling takes nine years,
senior secondary schooling takes three years, and most courses in the university except
engineering, law, and medicine run for four years. In addition to this, a nonformal system
of education is operational among Muslims and includes the Quranic, Islamiyyah, and
almajiri schools (Oladosu, 2012).
As far back as 1921, there were 30,411 Islamic schools in northern Nigeria, and by
2006, it was estimated that over seven million males a year were matriculating into
Quranic schools (Aluaigba 2009:20). Currently, there are about 9.5 million almajirai
in northern Nigeria (Oladosu, 2012). About half of these are domiciled in the core
Northeast geographical zone, which is also the hotbed of BH terrorism. The high rate
of enrollment into almajiri schools all over northern Nigeria contrasts sharply with the
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low enrollment in formal schools and represents a serious problem. A 2009 survey
carried out by the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) indicated that the
enrollment of pupils into Quranic schools trippled that of formal schools in Sokoto
and Zamfara states. A similar trend was observed in a survey conducted by the Federal
Ministry of Education and UNICEF in 2008, which revealed a total pupil enrollment
of 514, 264 in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara states. When these
figures are compared with the total number of 54,434 public primary schools across
the country, it becomes clear that Quranic schools have a commanding presence in the
North (Olagunju, 2012).
The scope of curriculum in Quranic schools is myopic, as it does not include such
orthodox subjects as mathematics, English, social studies, and basic science. The
almajiri curriculum centers mainly on the reading and the writing of the Quran and on
tafsir, hadith, and tawhid and other branches of Islamic studies (Oladosu, 2012, p.
1821). This deficiency in science-oriented subjects and in modern information, com-
munication, and technology, as well as entrepreneurial skills development, negatively
affects the students in the labor market after graduation, making many of them unem-
ployable. Perhaps it is because it has become an avenue for imbuing the youth with
skills that are not needed in the labor market that many people have concluded that
almajiri culture has outlived its importance. Indeed, the almajiri population has grown
exponentially, and a large majority have been unable to turn their education into 
productive jobs, thereby turning them into “social misfits” who pose a security risk
(Aluaigba, 2009).
With time, the almajiri system, which was meant to inculcate Islamic virtues in 
the youth, degenerated into a practice characterized by unwholesome and inhumane
activities. At the formative stage of almajiri schooling, it was not envisaged that the
Quranic pupils would have to beg for alms permanently or do menial jobs for their
survival, as it is the practice today. These days, a typical almajiri can be spotted by his
unsavory appearance—dressed in tattered clothes, disease afflicted, and armed with 
a plastic plate, he roams the streets begging for alms. Socially regarded as nuisance,
the almajirai are often chased away by decent people. They hang around restaurants,
markets, shops, petrol stations, and houses, most times sleeping on disused pieces of
cardboard or bare floors. The street urchins bemoan their fate as they watch other 
privileged children enjoy life with their parents (Olagunju, 2012; Loimeier, 2012). As
a result of these social and economic deprivations, some almajirai end up becoming
commercial errand boys, hewers of wood, or fetchers of water (known locally as “mai
rua”). Yet many take to petty theft, thuggery, and peddling of hard drugs. Some find
life too cruel and unbearable to be meaningful and commit suicide. This was the case
with a young almajiri who hanged himself at the Ungwar Maihauta area of Minna in
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Niger state in 2011 (Adofetekun, 2011).
The socioeconomic destitution of the almajirai makes them easy prey to conflict
enterpreneurs—desperate politicians who will stop at nothing in their quest for power
and resources—who pay the street urchins peanuts to execute criminal acts. Today, the
almajirai have become ready-made recruits for prosecuting violence against political
and business opponents and rivals. As rightly noted by Oladosu, many almajirai are:
Exploited and used by the politicians as thugs and hoodlums to foment trouble,
cause a riot, disrupt peace and achieve selfish political interest. In fact, it has
been alleged that most of the terrorist attacks involving suicide bombings,
setting places of worship ablaze, killing innocent souls and destroying property
were masterminded by jobless pupils of the Al-majiri schools (Oladosu, 2012,
p. 1821).
The instrumentalization of disaffected youth for violence is, however, not new in
the region. Militia groups such as Dan Kalare in Gombe, Yan Sara Suka in Bauchi,
ECOMOG in Borno were, for instance, used by politicians in their struggle for power
in the run up to the 2007 elections and thereafter (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In
addition to these groups and the more notorious Hisba, there are a plethora of local
gangs such as Yan Farauta (gangs of hunters), Yan Tauri (persons who make and use
ritual herbal medicine to prevent injuries from weapons), and Yan Dada (young 
marginal toughs) who lead violent lives on the edges of urban society in northern
Nigeria. The ready availability of the members of these groups has been accompanied
by the growing dysfunctionality and corruption of the federalized police force, creating
a serious problem (Last, 2008; Dawha, 1996).
The almajirai are even abused by the mallams, who are supposed to stand in loco
parentis to them. It is usually a tall order to bring back the proceeds they get from the
sorts of dehumanizing jobs they do. Recently, a ritualist mallam was caught sucking
the penis of an almajiri. The mallam confessed that the sperms were to be used for
money rituals (Oladipo, 2012). However, though the almajirai are more vulnerable to
abuse than other children, the menace of child abuse is national in Nigeria. Children are
conscripted for street hawking, domestic service, and commercial sexual exploitation
as well as for dangerous artisanal gold mining. And in addition to domestic trafficking
in persons (including children and youth), the country is notorious for being a source,
transit point, and destination of international human trafficking (Aluaigba, 2009).
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THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ALMAJIRI (AB)USES
The abuse of the almajiri has a number of implications for state and society in
Nigeria as well as for the country’s immedite neighbors. As noted earlier, the abuse of
the children makes them extremely vulnerable to conflict entrepreneurs—especially
do-or-die politicians—desperate business persons, and clerics preaching religious
intolerance (Imobighe, 2012) who promise better life opportunities. The system has
over time become a breeding ground for criminality and insecurity (Loimeier, 2012),
spawning youths who are significantly inclined to violence as a means of survival or
making their voices heard. Almajiri training provides one of the easiest avenues for
indoctrination and radicalization. For example, the almajirai are made to chant songs
of protest and radicalization that criticize “makarantan boko” (schools providing western
education) and praise “makarantan addini or makarantan allo” (schools for Islamic
instruction):
Yan makarantan boko
Ba karatu, ba sallah
Sai yawan zagin mallam
The song translates as:
Pupils of Western schools,
You do not learn or pray
but only abuse your teacher.
Indeed, the case of almajiri Usman Musa demonstrates the evil consequences 
of manipulation. On July 9, 2010, the 19-year-old was arrested by the police for
attempting to assassinate the emir of Kano with a gun during a Jumal service at the
Kano Central Mosque. The emir of Kano is one of the most prominent Muslim leaders
in Nigeria. On interrogation, the almajiri confessed that he was only doing the bidding
of his mallam, who also gave him the weapon and some charms. He added that a week
earlier, he had deposited the sum of 1 million which he and his mallam had robbed
from an Igbo trader (Abuh, 2010). Furthermore, confessions of children arrested in
connection with BH terrorism provide insights into the vulnerability and radicalization
that lead them into violence. Some of the 35 children released in May 2013 confessed
to be almajirai. One of them admitted that they were paid about $30 each by some
politicians and rebel leaders to spy on troops, vandalize property, and maim and kill
non-Muslims: “We were given a keg of petrol by our bosses to set some schools
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ablaze, which we did within Maiduguri and we were paid N5000” (Alli, 2013, p. 4).
Another almajiri “child soldier” said:
We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out for the soldiers at their units and
reported back to them [BH]. We were reporting when soldiers were at ease or
enjoying themselves and when they were off guard, and we were paid for doing
that (Alli, 2013, p. 4)
Conservative estimates put the number of people who have died in BH-related 
conflicts at over 3,600 (Osumah, 2013). Most of the victims are innocent civilians,
including men, women and children, who have been killed in such public places as
worship centers, schools, markets, and relaxation spots. A sizable number of security
personnel have also been killed as a result of carefully planned and executed attacks
on security formations such as police stations and soldier barracks. Media houses have
also been bombed, as well as the U. N. office in Nigeria’s federal capital territory,
Abuja (LeVan, 2013). Apart from inflicting serious injuries and permanent disabilities
on people, violent youth attacks in the caliphate North have also led to the internal 
displacement of thousands within Nigeria and a large flow of refugees into Niger,
Chad, and Cameroon (Soria, 2012). But the Nigerian government and the Muslim
community saw the almajiri menace coming. A former permanent secretary in the
Ministries of Water Resources, Science and Technology, and Education in Jigawa state
had in 2010 alerted the nation to the danger of the Quaranic students when he stated
that “we are only grooming them as future terrorists not only in Nigeria, but in the
whole of Africa” (Umenne, 2010, p. 6). Indeed, various studies have also implicated
the almajiri system in several urban revolts in northern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013; 
Imobighe, 2012).
However, the use of social miscreants as canon fodder has a long history in northern
Nigeria, as shown by the Maitatsine urban revolts which broke out in Kano in 1980
and spread to Maiduguri and Kaduna in 1982, Jimeta-Yola in 1984, and Gombe in
1985. Muhammed Marwa, who led the Maitatsine uprising which claimed over 5000
lives, obviously the precursor to BH terrorism, had exploited the dwindling economic
situation of northern Nigeria in the early 1980s by recruiting foot soldiers from the
almajiri system (Loimeier, 2012; Winters, 1987). Street urchins who were unable to
afford the basic necessities of life became diehard patriots of the Islamic sect and
Marwa. The Maitatsines preached that killing was compulsory and they believed they
would go to heaven if they killed arnas (infidels) (Elaigwu, 2005; Falola, 1998).
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EXPLAINING ALMAJIRI-RELATED INSECURITY
The almajiri menace, to reiterate, is a consequence of a terrible youth bulge 
syndrome. Apart from being the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria also has 
the highest birth rate on the continent (Aluaigba, 2009). High levels of illiteracy,
unemployment, and poverty accompany this explosive youth demographic cohort in
the North. As noted by theorists of youth bulge, such societies are prone to violent
conflict.
One of the core drivers of violent conflicts in northern Nigeria is widespread illitera-
cy engendered by poor education. To date, the North has the highest level of illiteracy
in the country despite efforts aimed at promoting literacy, including the universal 
primary education program launched in 1976 and the universal basic education (UBE)
program, which was relaunched in 1999 (just before the proclamation of the millenium
development goals by the international community). The UBE is aimed at providing
free, universal basic education for every Nigerian child of school-going age. At best,
these programs have only prioritized quantity over quality; as Hoechner remarks, “The
push to expand primary school enrollment often has, for the children of the poor,
resulted in swollen classes, lacking even the most basic educational resources, super-
vised sometimes by underpaid, barely trained teachers” (2011, p.719).
Though a national problem, educational crisis is worse in the North than in the
South. The wide educational imbalance between the North-South divide has existed
since colonial times when formal education was introduced into the country by Euro-
pean Christian missionaries. While the missionaries were given a free rein and allowed
to establish schools in southern Nigeria, British administrators strictly restricited their
activities in the northern region as part of a policy of indirect rule that allowed emirs
there to remain in power as figureheads while in fact serving as agents of the British
(Osaghae, 2002). As Mustapha (1986) notes, when Western education was finally
introduced into the northern region, the system was aimed at training the sons of 
aristocrats and was used as a form of social control. The early exposure to Western
education gave the southern region an edge over the North in administration and
employment. Table 1 documents the educational imbalance between the regions prior
to independence in 1960.
Instructively, table 1 shows that in 1957 (three years before Nigeria’s independence)
the northern region, which had over 16.8 million people (based on the 1952 census),
had only 3,643 secondary school enrollments, whereas the southern region, with only
13.2 million, had 28,208 secondary school enrollments. The academic imbalance
between the regions continued after independence, as shown in table 2.
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Today, the northern region remains backward in terms of formal education and
human capital development. In fact, in its latest education-for-all global monitoring
report, UNESCO reveals that 10.5 million school-age children are out of school in
Nigeria, accounting for about 47 percent of the 12 nations sampled. The report shows
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Table 1. Difference in Modern Education between Northern and Southern Nigeria, 1906-1957
Southern Nigeria (Population 13.2 Million Northern Nigeria (Population 16.8 Million 
according to 1952 Census) according to 1952 Census)
Student Enrollment Student Enrollment
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
1906 11,872 20 Not available 0
1926 138,249 518 5,210 0
1947 538,391 9,657 70,962 251
1957 2,343,317 28,208 185,484 3,643
Source: Anifowose (2006, p. 46).
Table 2. Primary Enrollment Fractions, 1970





Northeast (including present-day Borno) 8.6









Source: Nduka (2006, p. 197).
that one out of 5 school-age child is out of school in the country. Other countries 
sampled included Pakistan (1.5 million), Ethiopia (2.4 million), India (2.3 million),
Philippines (1.5 million) Cote d’Ivoire (1.2 million), Burkina Faso (1 million), Niger
(1 million), Kenya (1 million), Yemen (0.9 million), Mail (0.8 million), and South
Africa (0.7 million) (Guardian, 2013b).
The statistics of a recent educational survey are even more appalling. The report
shows that only 28 percent of sampled school-age children attend school in Zamfara,
29 percent in Borno, 29 percent in Kebbi, 34 percent in Sokoto, and 42 percent in
Yobe. The survey also shows that 72 percent of children in Borno have never been to
school. By contrast, the report shows that over 90 percent of children sampled in the
southern region were in school (Nation, 2011). Even a few well-intended educational
programs of the government have not been popular with the people in the northern
region. For example, to check the growing linkage between the almajiri cohort and
BH, the federal government created the Ministerial Committee on Madrasah Education
on February 16, 2010. The report of the committee resulted in the setting up of an
almajiri education program, which was aimed at integrating the million-plus almajirai
into the UBE program. As part of the almajiri education program, 89 model almajiri
schools with state of the art equipment, including boarding facilities, were to be built
in 25 states across the country (see table 3). Expectedly, the almajirai populated and
BH-prone states of Kano, Borno, and Bauchi were projected to have 7, 6 and 5 model
schools respectively.
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1 Adamawa 3 1 4
2 Bauchi 3 2 5
3 Borno 5 1 6
4 Edo 1 0 1
5 Ekiti 1 0 1
6 Gombe 1 1 2
7 Jigawa 3 1 4
8 Kaduna 4 1 5
9 Kano 6 1 7
10 Katsina 3 1 4 
The first almajiri model school built at Gagi village in Sokoto was commissioned
in 2012. Ironically, despite the fact that tuition and accommodation are free and the
pupils are not charged for their meals, many Muslim parents have refused to send their
children to the school for fear of their children being corrupted by Western education.
Such an attitude creates an ignorant pool of vulnerable youths who can be easily
manipulated by conflict entrepreneurs. While the government may not have sensitized
the people adequately to accept the new educational policy for the almajirai, such
public disdain for formal education is not only historical but also resonates in BH 
narratives of grievance. In fact, the phrase “boko haram” literally means “Western
education is forbidden” in the Hausa language (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012).
Another intervening variable that makes the almajiri demographic cohort volatile
is the high level of unemployment in the North. As noted earlier, the BH became the
second deadliest terrorist group in the world in 2012 ostensibly because of the cheap
availability of almajiri foot soldiers that are willing to put their destinies in the hands
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11 Kebbi 2 1 3
12 Kogi 4 0 4
13 Kwara 4 0 4
14 Lagos 1 0 1
15 Nasarawa 3 2 5
16 Niger 3 2 5
17 Ogun 2 0 2
18 Ondo 1 0 1
19 Osun 2 0 2
20 Oyo 4 0 4
21 Rivers 0 1 1
22 Sokoto 4 1 5
23 Taraba 2 0 2
24 Yobe 3 1 4
25 Zamfara 6 1 7
Total 71 18 89
Source: Adapted by authors from almajiri model school committee report.
of the BH. Indeed, as Urdal (2006) argues, when a large pool of young people find
themselves confronting unemployment, poverty, and squalor that lead to unmitigated
despondency, they are increasingly likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of
generating income. It is worse for individuals like the almajirai who are uneducated
and therefore lack the hope and income-earning opportunities that come with education
(Collier, 2000). Nigeria is a nation that places a high premium on paper qualifications
at the expense of experience in the labor market. As a result, people such as the almajirai
who lack generally acceptable certificates stand little chance of employment. As
shown in able 4, the rate of unemployment in northern Nigeria is much higher than in
the South. Interestingly, even within the region, the rate of unemployment in BH
hotbed states in 2011 is relatively high: 41 percent in Bauchi, 35.6 perccent in Yobe,
and 29 percent in Borno.
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Table 4. Unemployment Rates, by State, 2007-2011
State 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Abia 25.1 11.9 14.5 22.8 11.2
Adamawa 21.5 13.5 29.4 24.6 33.8
Akwa-Ibom 18.0 11.1 34.1 27.7 18.4
Anambra 14.9 7.3 16.8 10.8 12.2
Bauchi 20.5 6.9 37.2 27 41.4
Bayelsa 21.9 67.4 41.5 27.4 23.9
Benue 7.9 7.8 8.5 6 14.2
Borno 12.5 11.8 27.7 26.7 29.1
Cross River 32.8 18.9 14.3 27.9 18.2
Delta 22.9 11.5 18.4 27.9 27.2
Ebonyi 7.9 5.1 12 25.1 23.1
Edo 14.8 15.6 12.2 27.9 35.2
Ekiti 11.4 11.5 20.6 28 12.1
Enugu 14.1 10.5 14.9 28 25.2
Gombe 16.9 7.6 32.1 27.2 38.7
Imo 28.3 17.4 20.8 28.1 26.1
Jigawa 27.0 5.9 26.5 14.3 35.9
Kaduna 8.7 12.7 11.6 12.4 30.3 
A number of scholars have noted that the combination of a massive youth popula-
tion and a high rate of unemployment is a recipe for political instability, rebellion, and
warfare (Collier, 2007; Urdal, 2007). Indeed, unemployed northern youth bear a strong
animosity toward educated young people from the South, whom they accuse of being
too sophisticated and domineering in the labor market. A similar hatred for prospective
employees also allegedly fuels BH attacks on tertiary institutions in the northern
region. In Mamudo in July 2013, BH killed 31 students, a teacher, and one local resident.
In June 2013, the group launched an attack on the government secondary school in
Damaturu, killing seven students and two teachers; and the bombing of a Christian
worship center at Bayero University, Kano in April 2012, killed two professors and 13
others (Egharevba & Aghedo, 2013; Mgboh, 2012).
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State 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Kano 10.1 5.8 27.6 14.7 21.3
Katsina 10.9 11.8 37.3 11 28.1
Kebbi 1.3 16.5 12 10.7 25.3
Kogi 14.6 16.4 19 9.5 14.4
Kwara 17.7 10.2 11 2.7 7.1
Lagos 13.7 7.6 19.5 27.6 8.3
Nasarawa 11.8 17 10.1 3.4 36.5
Niger 4.2 3.9 28 11.7 39.4
Ogun 3.6 5.8 8.5 27.8 22.9
Ondo 6.7 6.3 14.9 28 12.5
Osun 7.2 6.5 12.6 27.6 3
Oyo 8.1 8.7 14.9 27.7 8.9
Plateau 6.8 4.7 7.1 10.4 25.3
Rivers 66.4 12.1 27.9 27.8 25.5
Sokoto 12.3 5.9 22.4 15.9 17.9
Taraba 15.2 19.9 26.8 24.7 12.7
Yobe 24.4 12.8 27.3 26.2 35.6
Zamfara 19.1 16.4 13.3 14.5 42.6
FCT 47.8 8.7 21.5 11.8 21.1
Nigeria (national) 12.7 14.9 19.7 21.4 23.9
Source: Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics (2012, p. 41).
Relative poverty is another intervening variable driving the correlation between 
the almajiri population and insecurity in the region. The level of poverty in northern
Nigeria is higher than the national average. And the worst hit people are the almajirai,
who are totally dependent on alms for survival. Owing to widepread poverty, some
parents are left with no choice than to continue sending their children into the street
disguised as alimajirai . According to the National Bureau of Statistics 2010 poverty
profile, though poverty permeates the entire country, it is more profound in the North.
The report shows that among the six geopolitical zones of the country, the Northwest
and Northeast (operational bases of BH) recorded the highest poverty rates of 70 per-
cent and 69 percent, respectively. The projection of the bureau for year 2011 was also
gloomy with predictions of 71.5 percent, 61.9 percent, and 62.8 percent poverty rates
for North-Central, Northeast and Northwest, respectively (Punch, May 8, 2012). The
U.N. 2008-2009 human development report rated the North as the poorest region of
the country, using such indicators as child mortality, maternal mortality, and the presence
or absence of diseases like polio and measles, which have been nearly eradicated in
southern Nigeria (Agbaegbu, 2012).
Furthermore, the proliferation of gangs, militias, and vigilantes, many of which
operate outside state control, leads to insecurity by providing a source of weapons and
training for miscreants, including almajirai. The apparent weakness of the Nigerian
security establishment, particularly the police force, which is saddled with the respon-
sibility of maintaining internal security, has encouraged the activities of alternative
providers of security such as self-help vigilante groups (Hills, 2011). In the Southwest
of Nigeria, the O’odua People’s Congress militant youth wing engages in some form
of policing; in the Southeast, the Bakassi Boys (now officially disbanded) took to 
vigilantism in the region; and in northern Nigeria, the Yan Daba participates in what
Conerly (2007) describes as “policing by force.” A common thread that runs in these
groups is that the method employed in fulfilling their mandate (ensuring that their
domian is secured internally and externally) is force, which increases the scope of 
violence and criminality.
In much of northern Nigeria, the Yan Daba (a reserved army of the unemployed)
often take care of the almajirai, who serve as the main pool for Yan Daba recruitment.
The almajirai play the role of errand boys while the Yan Daba membership act as
mentors, whom the average almajiri child looks up to. This relationship is cemented
by the seeming unity of purpose that they share: standing in antithesis to anything or
anybody perceived as responsible for their dehumanized condition. These groups often
act in ways that are indicative of the ease with which they metamorphose into tribal
and religious terrorists. The Yan Daba sometimes forments trouble in the North in
reaction to events that occur even outside the region. In 1999, for example, when
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Hausa residents clashed with their Yoruba hosts in the town of Sagamu in Ogun state,
it was the Yan Daba group that organized a reprisal attack against the Yoruba residents
in Kano. The Hausa residents of Kano are known to have great trust in the ability of
the Yan Daba to protect them, to the extent of boasting arrogantly of the group’s
capacity to annihilate other militant groups in the South if they get the “white flag”
from the state government. This suggests some form of collaboration between the
group and the state. Human Rights Watch (2005) ascribes the huge success of the
2004 religious attacks in Kano (home to the highest number of destitute children) to
the involvement of the almajirai. Also, the postelection violence in 2011, which claimed
the lives of over 800 Nigerians, was said to have been prosecuted by teenagers who
attend Quranic schools (Elombah, 2011).
Groups like the Yan Daba, BH, and their almajiri recruits claim to be committed to
the purification of Islam, which sets them against anybody that fails to adhere to the
dictates of the Quran, and this includes even Muslims of Yoruba extraction, who they
regard as untrue Muslims for sabotaging their desire for an orthodox Islam, along with
the Nigerian police force, which attempts to curtail their activities. Recent threats and
attacks on police headquarters and other police posts by the BH sect make clear just
how antagonistic the relationship between the BH and the police is (Adisa, 2011; Human
Rights Watch, 2011) and is also indicative of the BH’s willingness to exterminate any
opposition to its so-called Islamization agenda. Yet, religion is only used as a tool to
legitimize their violent operations, which are carried out by the spiraling youth popu-
lation that has become uncontrollable due to the region’s development crises.
By and large, the crisis of governance is a critical driver of insecurity in the north-
ern region. It explains why the number of youths far exceeds the number of available
jobs, why illiteracy is prevalent, and why poverty remains pervasive across the coun-
try, despite the fact that Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil-producing nation and second
largest economy. Nigeria’s ruling elite are insensitive to the plight of the people, in
gross contravention of section 16(2) (d) of chapter 2 of the country’s 1999 Constitution,
which enjoins the state to direct its policy toward ensuring that suitable and adequate
shelter and food are provided for the people, that a reasonable national minimum 
living wage, including old age care and pensions, are guaranteed for workers, and that
unemployment and sick benefits are provided for all, as well as ensuring the welfare of
the disabled. Despite Nigeria’s enormous oil and gas resouces, the country paradoxically
remains a “rich country with poor people” owing to monumental leadership corruption.
Obscene corruption has colossally damaged the image of Nigeria locally and internation-
ally, as evidenced by the country’s persistent poor rating in the Corruption Perception
Index (see table 5).
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Thus, it would appear from table 5 that Nigeria’s rating only improved a little when
the ranking involved more corrupt states (e.g., in 2008 and 2009), an indication that
did not show much progress as further revealed by the appalling CPI score.
As noted by Akingbade and Akinola (2013, p. 4), the immediate cause of the BH
uprising is traceable to poor governance, corruption, and the manipulation of deprived
youth by many politicians “who were looking for votes and allies in religious terror
machines and made pledges of establishing institutions based on Islam.” Instructively,
these conflicts further compound the development crisis in the Muslim-dominated
region. The human and economic costs of the insurgency are enormous, but there are
also other less visible negative consequences. For example, no investor would want 
to invest in areas that are not stable or prone to violent conflicts. In fact, the wave of
insecurity has forced many businesses to close down and others to relocate to safer areas
(Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). This exacerbates the employment, poverty, and education
crises. For example, incessant attacks on schools in Yobe and Borno in 2013 not only
led to the destruction of buildings and instructional materials but also to the closing
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Table 5. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Nigeria 1996-2010
S/No. CPI Score Ranking Number of Countries Number of Countries (Max=10) Ranked Ranking Worse
1 1996 0.69 54 54 0
2 1997 1.76 52 52 0
3 1998 1.9 81 85 4
4 1999 1.6 98 99 1
5 2000 1.2 90 90 0
6 2001 1.0 90 91 1
7 2002 1.6 101 102 1
8 2003 1.4 132 133 1
9 2004 1.6 144 146 2
10 2005 1.9 152 159 5
11 2006 2.2 142 163 13
12 2007 2.2 147 179 31
13 2008 2.7 121 180 59
14 2009 2.5 130 180 50
15 2010 2.4 134 178 44
Source: Francis, Deirdre, & Rossiasco (2011, p. 44).
down of all schools for several months owing to safety concerns (Egharevba & Aghedo,
2013). This is a huge setback for a region that is already educationally backward.
CONCLUSION: TAMING THE MONSTER
The article has argued that violent insecurity in northern Nigeria is driven by the
phenomenon of youth bulge. The region is home to an unusually large army of itinerant
Quranic pupils who operate on the margins of society. The destitute almajirai depend
largely on public philanthropy and alms for survival—a fact that makes them vulnerable
to conflict mobilization. However, we have contended that the presence of a large pool
of street urchins does not cause conflict in itself, that some crucial variables intervene
to precipitate violence. We have presented a graphic description of the socioeconomic
deprivations and lack that characterizes the sprawling environment the almajirai
inhabit. Without their receiving the socially required educational training, the labor
market is shut against the street urchins. The resultant unemployment drives the beggars
into dependency and abject poverty. The vulnerability arising from this destitution
makes the almajirai easy prey to conflict entrepreneurs, religious bigots and BH 
insurgents. Thus, violent insecurity in northern Nigeria is fuelled by the explosive 
population of youth who lack sustainable livelihoods. Notwithstanding the popular
rhetoric of Islamic jihadism, the solution to the conflict lies more in development
building and state intervention.
To mitigate widespread insecurity in the sprawling north, effective and quality edu-
cation is necessary. Since there is a deep-seated disdain for Western education in the
region, the almajiri education system should be overhauled, and orthodox subjects such
as mathematics and English should be added to the curriculum together with relevant
business and technical subjects. The state-owned National Business and Technical
Examinations Board (NABTEB) can be made to assume this responsibility because 
it already conducts national examinations in these subjects. The mallams and other
experts should be used in teaching these vocational courses. The inclusion of the 
mallams, whom the almajirai and their parents are already used to, will make the 
families receptive. However, the Islamic scholars will have to go through the necessary
retraining for curricular and pedagogic reasons. It is crucial that this integration of
modern education into the almajiri school system be preceded and followed through by
public sensitization campaigns, preferably in local languages and involving mallams,
Muslim clerics, and local community leaders. All these will ensure that the policy
does not suffer the same fate as the almajiri model education program.
Considering the premium on certificates in Nigerian society, it is important that
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graduates of the new system be given certificates by NABTEB after they have satisfied
the requirements set out by the reform. The issuance of certificates will enable the
graduates to get employment in government and private sectors, thereby reducing
poverty and reliance on alms, which make the youth vulnerable. Also, the monthly
revenues allocation to all states in the federation, including those in the North, should
be monitored by citizens and civil society groups to ensure that such revenues are put
to good use. As noted, almajiri-related insecurity is fallout from the governance crisis,
especially the privatization of public resources by the ruling elite that has led to poor
education, unemployment, and mass poverty. Though corruption is prevalent in all
sectors and areas of Nigeria, it is worse in the northern region. Therefore, civil society
groups and enlightened individuals everywhere in the country should scrutinize 
revenue allocation to the North to reduce diversion. But for pervasive corruption, the
North should not be underdeveloped since its political elite have dominated Nigerian
leadership more than their counterparts in the South. Obviously, oil revenue allocations
to the region have been largely mismanaged.
Furthermore, since many arrested almajiri members of BH have confessed to being
sponsored, the government should muster the required political will and bring sponsors
of violence to book. Religious clerics who preach hatred and intolerance should be
monitored and cautioned. If they persist in inciting the youth against the state and 
society, they should be tried openly and fairly in the courts and appropriate punishment
meted out to them. This will serve as deterrence to others and so check the culture of
impunity among conflict entrepreneurs. Lastly, the government needs to ensure that
the Nigerian business environment is conducive for investment. Apart from pervasive
insecurity, Nigeria suffers from abysmal infrastructural decay. For example, the electric
power supply is epileptic. And a weak infrastructure serves as a disincentive to investors
because it increases the cost of doing business in a country. Thus, when the government
at all levels provides the necessary infrastructure and ensures an appreciable degree of
political stability, investors will be attracted into the country, including the northern
region. This will boost youth employment and alleviate poverty and ultimately increase
the opportunity costs of rebellion.
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